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Abstract 
An understanding of the resilience of energy systems is critical in order to tackle forthcoming 
challenges. This chapter proposes that the polycentric governance perspective, developed by 
Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, may be highly relevant in formulating policies to enhance the resilience 
of future energy systems. Polycentric governance systems involve the coexistence of many self-
organized centers of decision making at multiple levels that are formally independent of each other, 
but operate under an overarching set of rules. Given this polycentric approach, this chapter studies 
the roles of community-based energy initiatives and, in particular, of renewable energy 
cooperatives, in enhancing the institutional resilience of energy systems. In this perspective, the 
chapter identifies three major socio-institutional obstacles, which undermine this resilience 
capacity: the collective action problem arising from the diffusion of sustainable energy technologies 
and practices, the lack of public trust in established energy actors and the existence of strong vested 
interests in favor of the status quo. Then, it shows why the development of community-based 
energy initiatives and renewable energy cooperatives may offer effective responses to these 
obstacles, relying on many empirical illustrations. More specifically, it is argued that community-
based energy initiatives present institutional features encouraging the activation of social norms 
and a high trust capital, therefore enabling them to offer effective solutions to avoid free riding and 
enhance trust in energy institutions and organizations. The creation of federated polycentric 
structures may also offer a partial response to the existence of vested interests in favor of the status 
quo. Finally, some recommendations for policymakers are derived from this analysis. 
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Polycentric governance approaches for a low-carbon transition:  
the roles of community-based energy initiatives in enhancing the resilience 
of future energy systems 
Thomas Bauwens 
1. Introduction 
Energy systems are constituted of technological, social and ecological components and processes 
that interact with each other in a complex fashion. Acknowledging this complexity is crucial to 
coping with the challenges that energy systems currently present. The analyses of the political 
economist Elinor Ostrom and her collaborators may be very insightful in this endeavor. Although 
Ostrom’s approach comes within the scope of rational choice theories, she was conscious of the 
implications of complexity theory and incorporated some of its concepts, such as nonlinearity, self-
organization and feedback loops in to her own work (Morçöl 2014). Based on her contributions, 
energy systems can be conceptualized as complex “social-ecological systems” (SESs), i.e., systems 
of interdependent bio-physical and non-human biological units interacting with social and 
institutional components.1 SES scholars have been particularly interested in the determinants that 
reinforce or hinder the “resilience” of such systems. Resilience of an SES refers, essentially, to its 
capacity to retain the same system characteristics despite changes in the behavior of its component 
parts or the surrounding environment (Carlson and Doyle 2002, Walker et al. 2004).  
An understanding of the resilience of energy systems is critical in order to tackle forthcoming 
challenges. In particular, climate change and the depletion of fossil energy sources require massive 
transformations of our models of energy production and consumption. In response, the necessity 
of a transition to low-carbon sources is increasingly acknowledged. This transition will most likely 
imply the displacement of fossil fuels by various renewable, intermittent and distributed energy 
technologies along with energy demand reduction, and will be highly disruptive for established 
energy actors. The ability of future energy systems to implement this transition process will depend, 
therefore, on their resilience, understood as their capacity to deploy these renewable energy (RE) 
technologies fast enough so as to maintain their essential functions, such as the provision of energy 
services. However, several socio-institutional barriers can severely undermine this resilience. In this 
chapter, three barriers are discussed:  the collective-action problem, arising in the diffusion of more 
                                                          
1 Institutional components are constituted by the formal and informal rules shaping and structuring the interactions 
between people within collective settings (families, local communities, markets, business organizations, etc.) (Ostrom, 
2005). 
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sustainable energy technologies and practices; the lack of trust from the public in established energy 
actors; and the existence of strong vested interests within the energy industry in favor of the status 
quo. Regarding the first obstacle, averting climate change is an action of global and public interest, 
because everyone benefits from a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions even if not contributing 
to it. This problem can therefore be configured in terms of a collective-action problem (Sandler 
2004). According to the conventional theory of collective action, rational actors pursuing their own 
interest will indeed not participate in collective efforts because they have incentives to free-ride on 
the constructive behavior of others (Olson 1965; Hardin 1968).  
It is proposed in this chapter that the polycentric governance perspective, developed by Vincent 
and Elinor Ostrom, may be highly relevant in formulating policies to enhance the resilience of 
future energy systems. Polycentric systems involve the coexistence of many self-organized centers 
of decision-making at multiple levels that are formally independent of each other, but operate under 
an overarching set of rules (Ostrom et al. 1961). Given this polycentric framework, this chapter 
focuses on the roles of community-based energy (CBE) initiatives and, in particular, of RE 
cooperatives, in enhancing the institutional resilience of energy systems. CBE initiatives are formal 
or informal citizen-led initiatives which propose collaborative solutions on a local basis to facilitate 
the development of sustainable energy technologies (Walker and Devine-Wright 2008; Bauwens et 
al. 2016). As a specific form of CBE initiative, the cooperative model enables citizens to collectively 
own and manage RE systems at the local level (Huybrechts and Mertens 2014). CBE initiatives are 
therefore inspired by a self-organization principle, which is at the core of polycentric systems. 
This is organized as follows: the first section presents Elinor Ostrom’s approach to complexity and 
the main building blocks of her work, including the Social-Ecological System framework. The 
second section explores the concept of resilience of SESs and specifically emphasizes the need for 
institutional adaptability and polycentrism. The third section applies these theoretical lenses to 
energy systems. As a first step, the section shows how energy systems can be considered as social-
ecological systems and describes some essential features of the historical model of present energy 
systems, i.e. a model based on centralized extraction and conversion of fossil energies. Secondly, 
after discussing the need for a transition to low-carbon sources, this section describes three major 
barriers to this transition. The fourth section describes why the development of CBE initiatives 
and RE cooperatives may offer effective responses to these obstacles, and, finally, the last section 
provides some main conclusions and recommendations for policy-makers.   
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Elinor Ostrom and complex thinking 
There are many different notions and measures of complexity (Mitchell 2009). One way to define 
the complexity of a system is to characterize it in terms of its degree of hierarchy or level of 
organization (Simon 1962; McShea 2001). This approach sees complex systems as composed of 
multiple nested subsystems. Each subsystem possesses unique emergent properties, which depend 
on its own constitutive elements, but appear only when these elements are integrated. In this sense, 
each subsystem constitutes a whole, but is also, at the same time, a part of a larger structure. This 
nested, hierarchical structure is common to physical, biological and social complex systems (von 
Bertalanffy 1969). As an example in the biological context, the human body is composed of cells 
which are organized into tissues, which themselves constitute organs, which are parts of 
physiological systems. In the social context, individuals are part of families, which organize into 
villages or tribes, which organize into larger groupings, etc. 
Elinor Ostrom’s conception of complexity finds its roots in this hierarchical vision. Ostrom 
focused primarily on institutions, which are the rules, the norms, the dos and don’ts that structure 
all kinds of social interactions. She built on the concept of “holon” to describe and analyze the 
multilevel nature of complex institutional systems (Ostrom 2005). A holon refers to what, being a 
whole in one situation, is simultaneously itself just a part of another larger system (Koestler 1973). 
In this hierarchical approach to complexity, these part-whole units are the fundamental 
constituents of any complex system. This holon property also holds for institutional systems: rules 
affecting one situation are themselves parts of a larger system of rules designed by individuals 
interacting at a higher level of decision-making. Ostrom and her collaborators used this idea to 
develop the “Institutional Analysis and Development” (IAD) framework to help structured 
thinking about the elements that influence decision-making in social situations and, in particular, 
collective action situations and social dilemmas2. This framework offers a nested set of variables 
which can be used to investigate human interactions and outcomes in a wide variety of settings. It 
has notably been used as a basis for developing a theory of common-pool resource management 
and for studying decentralized natural resource policies (Yandle and Dewees 2003; Clement 2010).  
The IAD framework has been especially useful for studying social dilemmas at a micro-scale, but 
pays little attention to the broader social, institutional and physical environment, including 
demographic and market pressures. For this reason, a common criticism addressed to the IAD 
                                                          
2 A social dilemma is a situation in which an individual profits from selfishness unless everyone chooses the selfish 
alternative, in which case the whole group loses (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_dilemma for further 
information). 
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framework is that actors have often been presented as “independent of the larger historical and 
social context in which [they] operate” (Clement 2010: 131; see also Agrawal 2001). In order to 
include the influence of broader contextual variables, Ostrom and her colleagues designed the 
“Social-Ecological System” (SES) framework (Ostrom 2009; McGinnis and Ostrom 2014). A SES 
encompasses “interaction between, on one hand, a society’s cultural and institutional arrangements, 
and, on the other hand, its physical environment” (Aligica and Tarko 2014: 55). Indeed, human 
beings transform the physical environment into usable resources (food, raw materials and energy). 
In addition, SESs reflect the hierarchical approach to complexity described above, as they are 
composed of multiple subsystems, whiles being embedded in multiple larger systems (Anderies et 
al. 2004). The elementary unit of this framework is constituted by an “action situation”, in which 
multiple actors interact with each other under the influence of different contextual variables. These 
interactions produce outcomes, which are linked to contextual variables through feedback paths 
(Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Graphical representation of the Social-Ecological Framework. 
 
Source: McGinnis and Ostrom (2014). 
Contextual variables relate to four core interacting subsystems: Resource Systems, Resource Units, 
Governance Systems and Actors. Resource Systems designate the biological/technological systems 
from which Resource Units are extracted. These Resource Units can then be consumed, used as 
inputs in a production process or exchanged for other goods and services. Governance Systems 
include “the prevailing sets of processes or institutions through which the rules shaping the 
behavior of the [actors] are set and revised” (McGinnis 2011: 181). Actors are individuals or 
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collective entities who participate in relevant action situations and are defined by some shared 
attribute(s). Social, Economic, and Political Settings and Related Ecosystems represent respectively 
the broader social and ecological contexts that may influence the focal SES exogenously. 
Ostrom’s approach to resilience of complex social-ecological systems 
Most discussions about resilience currently unfold within the SES framework just presented. Social-
ecological resilience encompasses three properties (Carpenter et al. 2001): (a) the amount of 
disturbance a system can absorb while remaining “within the same domain of attraction (that is, 
retain the same controls on structure and function)”3; (b) the ability of the system to self-organize 
(versus lack of organization, or organization forced by external factors); and (c) the ability for 
learning and adaptation of the system. The first property, the “absorption capacity”, is an 
equilibrium approach to resilience. Under this perspective, a resilient SES is a system that returns 
to the pre-existing situation, conceived as a state of equilibrium, if disrupted (Holling et al. 1995). 
In the non-equilibrium vision of resilience, embedded in the third property, SESs are acknowledged 
to “organize around continuous change” (Janssen et al. 2007: 309). Under this perspective, the 
focus is not so much on a return to an initial equilibrium state, but rather on the idea of adaptability 
to shocks and stresses and on the extent to which institutions foster such adaptability. Closely 
linked to this definition of resilience are the notions of adaptive capacity (Gunderson 2000) and 
transformability (Walker et al. 2004). It may be worth noticing that, unlike sustainability, resilience 
can be desirable or undesirable. For instance, system states that reduce social well-being, such as 
polluted water supplies or dictatorships, can be highly resilient. In contrast, “sustainability is an 
overarching goal that includes assumptions or preferences about which system states are desirable” 
(Carpenter et al. 2001: 766). 
Janssen et al. (2007) showed that interactions between biophysical and social elements of an SES 
are bidirectional: pressures on ecological systems can affect the social-economic configuration and, 
conversely, threats to social-economic institutions can impact the biophysical environment. Social-
institutional components and, in particular, institutional adaptability are thus crucial to analyzing 
resilience of an SES. “An institutional arrangement that inhibits innovation or does not secure it at 
a fast enough rate is an institutional arrangement that undermines resilience” (Aligica and Tarko 
2014: 57). On the top of this capacity of institutions to adapt and change, Ostrom stressed the 
importance of self-organized initiatives by local actors in ensuring resilience of SESs. Indeed, under 
certain conditions, coordination and rules do not require external drivers or hierarchically superior 
                                                          
3 See Carpenter et al. (2001 :766). 
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forces to happen and can emerge from actors’ interactions. Relying on Shepsle’s (1989) definition 
of a robust institution, she sought to define the set of general principles that enable the maintenance 
of self-organization over time. These principles have been demonstrated empirically (Ostrom 1990) 
and theoretically (Wilson et al. 2013) to promote resilient SESs. These design principles are: (1) 
clearly defined and generally understood boundaries and institutional roles; (2) effective monitoring 
against free-riding; (3) graduated sanctions against offenders; (4) proportionality between costs and 
benefits; (5) conflict resolution mechanisms generating outcomes perceived as fair; (6) minimal 
recognition of rights to organize4; (7) effective collective choice arrangements such as consensus, 
which avoid decisions imposed by some members at the expense of others; and (8) subsidiarity and 
nested or “polycentric” structures.  
This last principle, which refers to the concept of “polycentricity”, is, according to Aligica and 
Tarko (2014), the most distinctive feature of the Ostromian approach to resilience. Polycentricity 
describes the coexistence of many self-organized and autonomous centers of decision making, all 
operating under an overarching set of shared rules (Ostrom et al. 1961). Polycentric systems involve 
the existence of local resource governance units nested in larger, general-purpose units located at 
higher levels of decision-making (often governments, but not necessarily), according to a principle 
of “Russian nesting dolls”. As stated above, self-organization is an essential guiding principle of 
polycentric systems. Accordingly, a key assumption of polycentric approaches is that governance 
arrangements are more effective when citizens have the juridical and material capabilities to self-
organize multiple governing bodies at diverse scales (Andersson and Ostrom 2008).  
Polycentric governance presents several practical advantages over highly centralized systems. First, 
it enhances the institutional resilience of an SES. By creating redundancy of local centers of decision 
making, it fosters the conditions for the experimentation and creativity needed to explore novel 
and potentially superior combinations of rule systems, i.e. for adaptability of rules. This redundancy 
also mitigates the effects of a governance failure by limiting such effects to one locality, compared 
to the substantial costs induced by a failure of a centralized unit that covers a large area. Second, 
polycentric systems may exhibit informational benefits compared to highly centralized systems by 
encouraging the use of local knowledge to devise rules that are better adapted to each local situation 
than any general set of rules. Highly complex systems of rules involve many interconnected factors 
that have to be taken into account, so that “no one, including a scientifically trained, professional 
staff, can do a complete analysis” (Ostrom 2000: 12). In these conditions, it is often better to rely 
                                                          
4 In Wilson et al.’s (2013: 522) words, “groups must have the authority to conduct their own affairs. Externally imposed 
rules are unlikely to be adapted to local circumstances and violate principle 3”. 
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on the knowledge that local resource users have accumulated, since they are likely to devise rules 
that are better adapted to their local needs than “one-size-fits-all” rules created at a very centralized 
level (Irwin 1995, Wynne 1996). A third, related benefit of polycentrism is that it enables feedback 
on the performance of rules to be captured in a disaggregated way (Ostrom 1999). Fourth, local 
resource users know each other. They are thus more likely to select trustworthy partners and 
exclude untrustworthy ones, enhancing the conditions for cooperation and reciprocity between 
participants (Powers and Thompson 1994; Andersson and Ostrom 2008). Fifth, polycentrism 
lowers enforcement costs by strengthening local perceptions of the legitimacy of rules, and also by 
making it easier to fashion rules that can affordably be monitored. Indeed, if local actors are 
involved in the design of rules and the monitoring of compliance with these rules, they will be apt 
to craft rules that make infractions highly obvious so that monitoring costs are lower. Further, by 
creating rules that are seen as legitimate, local actors encourage higher conformance. 
While polycentricity is opposed to highly centralized governance, the existence of an overarching 
set of shared rules implies that it should not be equated to full decentralization either. If the 
governance regime lacks coordination among self-organized initiatives, it will not operate as a 
system, but rather as a network of fragmented and unstructured actors who may dissipate their 
efforts in unproductive directions. This may lead to contradicting actions and poor efficiency 
(Black 2008).5 This is why, asides from bottom-up and self-organized initiatives, top-down 
institutions are crucial in the creation and maintenance of any polycentric governance system to 
coordinate the activities of the multiple participants, the resolution of conflicts between lower-level 
units and the exchange of information about what has worked well, and may be transferable, from  
one local setting to others. Mansbridge (2014) identifies at least four roles for these higher-level 
governance units: (1) the threat of imposing a solution if local parties cannot come to a negotiated 
agreement; (2) the provision of a relatively neutral source of information; (3) the provision of 
“institutional facilities” to facilitate negotiations; and (4) the monitoring of compliance and 
sanctioning defection from compliance in the implementation phase after the negotiators have 
reached agreement. 
One example of large-scale successful polycentric structure is the scientific community, as 
explained by Tarko (2015). This community lacks any central management or a formalized 
                                                          
5 In this perspective, some authors have pointed out various limitations linked with fully decentralized governance 
systems, among which are: the high cost of self-organization (Meinzen-Dick 2007); the risk of local tyrannies, i.e. the 
lack of democratic governance or the domination of self-organized systems by local leaders who change rules for their 
own advantage (Platteau and Gaspart 2003; Platteau 2004); the problem of stagnation, i.e. actors’ reluctance to produce 
new rules and institutions to innovate due to the complexity of the resource system involved; and the risk of conflict 
among user groups (Alston et al. 1999). 
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legislative or rule-enforcement body and multiple research centers coexist, each with its own 
somewhat different research agenda and preferred methods of investigation. Yet, the success of 
the scientific community and the progress of science is the result of an overarching set of shared 
informal rules which limits free-riding and enables the whole system to work. In environmental 
contexts, the polycentric perspective has been applied to analyze water (Marshall et al. 2013; Pahl-
Wostl and Knieper 2014) and forest resource management (Nagendra and Ostrom 2012). 
References to the polycentric perspective have been made to a limited degree in previous work on 
governance of energy systems (Sovacool 2011; Goldthau 2014; Koster and Anderies 2013) but 
without significant or systematic development. 
Resilience of energy systems and low-carbon transition 
Energy systems as social-ecological systems 
Recent studies argue for framing energy systems as SESs (Hodbod and Adger 2014; Bauwens et al. 
2016). Production, distribution and consumption activities within energy systems involve 
interactions between, on the one hand, ecological processes and technological artefacts and, on the 
other, social practices and systems of institutional rules. As such, they can be analyzed through the 
lenses of the SES framework introduced above. Energy systems consist of “resources that are 
converted through various means to provide energy services” (Löschel et al. 2009: 391), energy 
services being defined as the benefits that energy carriers produce for human well-being (e.g., 
mobility for an automobile, heat for a stove, mechanical energy for air circulation). Energy 
resources can be renewable and nonrenewable, as well as primary or secondary. Renewable 
resources include solar radiation and all of its biospheric transformations Renewable resources 
include solar radiation and all of its biospheric transformations (e.g. wind, moving water or 
biomass), and geothermal heat. Their main common characteristic is that they are naturally 
regenerated over a short period of time. Nonrenewable resources, on the other hand, cannot renew 
themselves within timeframes that are meaningful to humans. They include fossil fuels, coals, 
hydrocarbons and radioactive minerals. As for the second distinction, primary energy means the 
energy “embodied” in natural resources and not yet converted into other forms of energy. 
Secondary energy includes the forms of energy generated by conversion of primary resources, e.g., 
petroleum products, manufactured solid fuels and gases, or electricity. Crossing these two criteria 
yields four types of resources (Table 1). 
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Table 1. Different types of energy resources and fuels 
 Renewable Nonrenewable 
Primary Solar radiation, plant mass, wind, 
moving water 
Coals, crude oil, natural gases, uranium, 
other minerals 
Secondary Biodiesel, ethanol, processed 
wood-pellets, electricity  
Coke, coal gas, refined crude oils, nuclear 
fuel rods, electricity 
Source: Sovacool and Dworkin (2014). 
It follows that energy systems can be subdivided into two major types of Resource Systems: bio-
physical Resource Systems, which are natural, and technological Resource Systems, which are 
human-made. Bio-physical Resource Systems refer to the systems from which primary energy 
resources are extracted and, in the case of renewable resources, through which the levels of the 
focal resource are regenerated by natural dynamic processes. Nonrenewable resources “are defined 
in terms of reserves or energy stocks, which can be depleted over time”, whereas “renewable energy 
resources are defined in terms of energy flows (e.g., energy production per year)” (Löschel et al. 
2009: 396). For this reason, the distinction between Resource Systems and Resource Units is 
blurred in the case of renewable resources. Resource Units of bio-physical Resource Systems are, 
for instance, the tons of oil or gas withdrawn from reservoirs, the photons radiated by the sun or 
the liters of water flowing from water sources. Bio-physical Resource System variables encompass 
the type and abundance of resources, their renewable or nonrenewable nature, their location, etc.  
Technological Resource Systems, on the other hand, are defined here as the set of humanly 
constructed facilities and infrastructures that enable the conversion, transport, distribution and 
consumption of primary or secondary energy. They can be decomposed into multiple constituents: 
the generation assets, the “delivery mechanisms” and the “prime movers”. Prime movers are “the 
technology that converts primary and secondary fuels into useful and usable energy services” 
(Sovacool and Dworkin 2014: 38), such as human muscles, steam engines, jet turbines or household 
electric appliances. Delivery mechanisms are the delivery infrastructures used to connect primary 
resources to prime movers, including pipelines, tankers, and electric transmission and distribution 
lines. The Resource Units of technological Resource Systems are the flows of primary or secondary 
energy circulating in these infrastructures. Technological Resource System variables cover the type 
of primary resource used, the characteristics of generation assets (their size, their load factor6, their 
                                                          
6 The load factor is the percentage of time an asset is operated at full load. 
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distance from the grid, whether they are intermittent or not), delivery mechanisms and prime 
movers. 
In addition to these bio-physical and technological characteristics, energy systems are shaped to a 
considerable extent by Governance Systems and Actors variables. For instance, Moe (2010) 
remarkably shows that the differences observed in the energy structure of countries cannot solely 
be explained by their different energy resource endowments. The occurrence and the pace of 
transitions from one energy source to another, for instance, are also largely determined by the level 
of political power and influence of established energy actors. In addition, energy systems are shaped 
to a large extent by households, grassroots actors and civil society (Smith 2012; Stern 2014). By 
supporting, accepting or opposing changes in larger energy systems, individuals acting as citizens 
can influence public policies or private organizations’ decisions and can contribute to shaping the 
transformation of energy systems. These reactions sometimes organize into social movements, e.g., 
public reactions to nuclear power, shale gas extraction infrastructures or onshore wind farms. 
The historical model of the energy supply industry 
It is worth highlighting two aspects of the way energy supply systems have been historically shaped: 
the dominance of fossil fuels as the main primary energy source and the development of a 
centralized model of energy supply. Regarding the first aspect, our dependence on fossil fuels is 
striking. Out of the 157,482 terawatt-hours (TWh) of primary energy generated in 2013 by 
humankind, fossil fuels provided about 81.4% of this total, while nuclear energy provided 4.8%, 
and renewable sources provided the remaining 13.8% (10.2% by biomass and waste, 2.4% from 
hydropower and less than 1.2% from other RE sources) (IEA 2015). Regarding the second aspect, 
the rise of fossil fuels coincided with the construction of very centralized technological Resource 
and Governance Systems which have prevailed until today. At the technological level, the dominant 
model of energy infrastructure is characterized by large centralized power stations generally located 
close to sources of fossil fuels and remote from load centers, which supply huge grids run by 
regional or national monopolies. The energy sector has emerged as a vertically and horizontally 
integrated system with important technical interdependencies. At the governance level, the energy 
industry was historically institutionalized along with this technological configuration, according to 
a highly hierarchical and centralized organization under the control of the State. It was vertically 
integrated, which means that firms operating in the different functions of the energy value chain, 
i.e. production, network activities and sales, were strongly interconnected through ownership 
rights, contracts and regulation (Künneke 2008). This was somewhat modified with market 
liberalization. In practice, however, although the liberalization process significantly changed e.g. 
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the European landscape of the power industry, institutions are still strongly marked by this 
historical configuration. For instance, according to DTI/Ofgem (2006), the market and regulatory 
models adopted in the UK at privatization reflected the predominantly centralized model of 
transmission and distribution. As a result of these technological and institutional evolutions, 
industrial economies have, to a large extent, become “locked” into fossil-fuel based, centralized 
energy systems through a path-dependent process driven by technological and institutional 
feedbacks and mutual reinforcements—so-called “increasing returns to adoption” in economists’ 
jargon (Unruh 2000). Once a country is “locked in,” it faces persistent market and policy failures 
that reduce the chances for alternative technologies to join the market (Arthur 1994; David 1985). 
Furthermore, in this model, actors from the demand-side, i.e. energy consumers, are minimally 
engaged in energy generation (Eyre 2013). Energy users do not need to know where energy is 
coming from, how it is produced and transported. Centralized generation “has led to the design 
and deployment of a range of energy technologies, services and procedures, from meters to bills 
to regulatory institutions to power stations, that foster minimal public engagement” (Devine-
Wright 2007: 68). From a supply-side perspective, it has led “designers, developers and installers 
of new energy technologies [to] aim to minimize public engagement since this would be assumed 
to increase the risk of resistance, delay, planning refusal and inefficient or incorrect use of 
technologies”.  
The dominance of fossil fuels poses major threats to the ecological and social sustainability of 
energy systems. Climate change at a global scale and local air pollution associated with greenhouse 
gas emissions are probably amongst the most alarming ones. Other challenges include energy 
security in a context of finite fossil sources and price volatility, the geopolitics of energy, universal 
access to energy services and energy poverty. While there is little consensus about when fossil 
resources will exhaust, the expected global demand expansion ensures an accelerated decline of 
current reserves. Furthermore, the world’s known remaining oil reserves are concentrated in 
unstable regions of the world, especially the Middle East. Similarly, the other main conventional 
energy fuels—coal, natural gas and uranium—are distributed very unevenly. This highly 
concentrated distribution of oil has caused the transfer of immense wealth from oil-importing 
countries to oil producers (Sovacool 2012). The concentration of fossil fuels also generates price 
volatility and interruptions in supply (Sovacool et al. 2014).   
These challenges require massive transformations of energy systems and call for a transition toward 
low-carbon energy systems. In turn, the ability of energy systems to implement this transition 
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process depends on their resilience, understood in this context as their capacity to deploy low-
carbon technologies so as to maintain their essential functions. 
Institutional obstacles to a low-carbon transition 
There are many constraints to a low-carbon transition, but most existing studies focus on the 
technical and economic feasibility of alternative energy systems in meeting energy demands at the 
same time as meeting a carbon reduction target (e.g., Ekins et al. 2013). The remainder of this 
chapter concentrates however on constraints of a socio-institutional nature. These mostly derive 
from a lack of support from society, organizations or government agencies or a lack of appropriate 
institutions to govern change. These challenges are thus more directly related to Governance 
Systems and Actors variables rather than to Resource Systems and Units. The focus is drawn on 
three specific challenges that are particularly threatening for institutional resilience of energy 
systems: the collective-action problem arising from the diffusion of sustainable energy technologies 
and practices, the lack of public trust in established energy actors and the existence of strong vested 
interests in favor of the status quo. 
Regarding the collective-action problem, following Samuelson (1954), economic goods are 
frequently classified into two categories: private goods and public goods. A good is purely private 
when the producer bears all the costs of production and a single consumer enjoys all the benefits 
of consumption. A pure public good, in contrast, is characterized by non-rivalry and non-
excludability. Non-rivalry means that an individual’s consumption of the good does not limit the 
capacity of others to consume the same good. Non-excludability implies that it is difficult to 
exclude individuals who have not paid for the good from its consumption. The collective-action 
problem is intimately related to the attribute of non-excludability. More precisely, a person who 
cannot be excluded from the benefits of a public good will have no incentive to bear a part of the 
costs of its production and will thus have a strong incentive to behave as a “free-rider” (Olson 
1965). Collective-action problems constitute a threat to the resilience of any SES, because they lead 
to overharvesting of common resources or to the underprovision of public goods and, eventually, 
to the collapse of the system.  
In the context of energy systems, averting climate change is a global and public interest. Past energy 
transitions (e.g., from traditional biomass to coal and from coal to oil) have been driven by a large 
minority of consumers who were willing to pay considerably more for privately accruing services 
associated with new energy sources or technologies (Fouquet 2010). In contrast, the environmental 
benefits of the current low-carbon transition are shared by all individuals and thus clearly present 
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characteristics of a public good. It is likely that too few consumers will be willing to pay more for 
the environmental improvements, although their number is growing (Longo et al. 2008). For 
instance, free-riding has indeed been identified as one of the major barriers to the diffusion of RE 
technologies. While attitudinal surveys demonstrate high levels of public support for green power 
products (Batley et al. 2001; Nomura and Akai 2004), the green marketing literature consistently 
reports a large gap between the number of residential customers willing to pay a premium for them 
and actual participation rates in green pricing programs (Byrnes et al. 1999; Wiser 1998). The 
collective-action problem has then also been identified as a barrier to sustainable electricity 
consumption within households (Ohler and Billger 2014). 
A second socio-institutional obstacle lies in the lack of trust in traditional energy actors. Trust in 
institutions can be defined as “believing that a person(s) or organization(s) can be relied upon to 
accomplish objectives because they are competent and possess values and intentions that are 
consistent with all or part of the public” (Greenberg 2014: 152).7 Trust is important for institutional 
adaptability and resilience because it enhances cooperation and enables shared cognition. That is 
to say, people feel they can rely on the statements of others without having to go back to first 
premises to check their validity (Cvetkovich 1999). This is why trust also enables actors to cope 
with new situations more quickly. In addition, trust appears to be a crucial element as far as energy 
systems are concerned, mainly because public concerns about risk have intensified in recent years 
(Slovic 1993). Nuclear power plants and waste management facilities, natural gas plants, fracking, 
oil refineries, giant hydropower dams and many other issues are examples of areas of public 
concern as regards energy. Trust is also an important ingredient in the transition to a low-carbon 
society, because the implementation of decentralized RE installations and smart-metering 
technologies need to be steered by individuals and organizations that are highly trusted and rooted 
in local communities (Eyre 2013). Trust in actors that are responsible for the development of a 
technology is critical when it comes to social acceptability of this technology, especially when 
people know little about it (Jobert et al. 2007; Walker et al. 2010; Huijts et al. 2012). In the wind 
power context, Eltham et al. (2008) have documented, through the study of public opinions of a 
local population living near a wind farm, how suspicion of the developers’ motives by the public, 
distrust of the developers and disbelief in the planning system may preclude the success of wind 
farm projects. Moreover, evidence shows a general lack of trust by the public in traditional energy 
actors as far as the development of alternative energy is concerned (Mumford and Gray 2010; 
                                                          
7 It is worth distinguishing institutional trust, which refers to trust in organizations and institutions managing energy 
projects, such as public authorities, developers, power utilities and other actors, from interpersonal trust, which 
describes trust among the members of a community and is closely connected to the notion of social capital (Walker et 
al. 2010). 
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Greenberg et al. 2012). This lack of trust in conventional energy actors is likely related to the 
centralized institutional configuration of energy systems described above. Institutions involved in 
energy (e.g., governments and multinational companies) form part of the expert systems of global 
politics, commodity markets and large scale engineering which are not easily accessible to ordinary 
citizens (Mumford and Gray 2010). The centralized model of energy supply also increases the 
spatial, social and political distances between actors and, therefore, undermines trust.  
A third important hindrance to low-carbon transition is the existence of strong vested interests. 
Profound shifts in the energy system toward a low-carbon society create “winners” and “losers” 
and “those that stand to gain or lose out will be at the heart of change debates” (Kuzemko et al. 
2016: 101). Generally, incumbent energy actors, including those in the fossil fuels and nuclear 
industries, and electric utility companies, have a vested interest in preserving the current system. 
For instance, traditional power utilities are directly damaged by the increase in the proportion of 
decentralized renewable technologies—especially photovoltaics—forming part of the total 
installed electricity capacity (Groot 2014). Furthermore, incumbent actors generally have enormous 
political influence and are able to coordinate their substantial resources to resist any change that 
threatens their interests. Actually, established actors do not always seek to resist change 
intentionally, but as they fight for their own interests (regulations, subsidies, favorable institutional 
arrangements, etc.), they often do this to the detriment of alternative energy. Vested interests are a 
threat to the resilience of energy systems because they lead to institutional rigidity. As Olson (1982) 
shows, an economic sector which becomes economically prosperous also typically acquires political 
influence and seeks to secure institutional arrangements that are beneficial to itself, but not for 
society at large. If a society is controlled by vested interests, it loses its ability to adapt and shift the 
status quo (Moe 2010). Based on a comparison between Japan, China, the United States, Germany, 
Denmark and Norway, Moe (2015) shows that whether or not renewable energy has been a success 
is determined by the extent to which countries have been successful in controlling these vested 
interests and prevented them from unduly influencing energy institutions. In turn, the ability of 
incumbent actors to be politically influential depends on the historical economic and political 
importance of the industries they represent (Kuzemko et al. 2016). 
The next section explains how community-based energy initiatives in general and energy 
cooperatives in particular may contribute to overcome these barriers to low-carbon transition and 
thus enhance the institutional adaptability and resilience of energy systems. 
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Community-based energy initiatives and institutional resilience 
Community-based energy (CBE) initiatives are typically characterized by a high degree of citizen 
agency and involvement in the ownership, management and benefits of projects (Walker and 
Devine-Wright 2008) and, as such, strongly echo the principle of local self-organized decision-
making units characterizing polycentric systems. The cooperative model is arguably one of the 
strongest forms of CBE initiative in Europe. It is not by chance that this model is the only one that 
is represented at the European level  by a federation.8 RE cooperatives are also often strongly 
embedded in the international cooperative movement, an international network of cooperatives 
and advocacy organizations that aim to promote and spread the cooperative principles of solidarity 
and democratic governance (Birchall 1997). Furthermore, while access to finance during the at-risk 
stage is acknowledged as a barrier to the development of community energy projects (Nolden 
2013), cooperatives are particularly suitable to ensure the financial viability of small-scale projects, 
through fundraising among community individuals, compared to other models depending on 
grants or loan schemes. 
The cooperative model enables citizens to collectively own and manage RE projects at the local 
level (Bauwens et al. 2016; Huybrechts and Mertens 2014). Through this model, citizens produce, 
invest in and, in some cases, consume RE. The following cooperative principles, adopted by the 
International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) in 1995 (ICA 1995), are generally common to all types 
of cooperatives around the world: voluntary and open membership, democratic member control 
(e.g., the “one person-one vote” rule), economic participation by members, autonomy and 
independence, education, training and information, cooperation among cooperatives, and concern 
for community. These principles clearly do not uniquely define cooperative structures and in 
Western Europe there is considerable variety in the legal forms of democratic enterprises (Borzaga 
and Defourny 2001)9, but in general these forms share features that embrace the above cooperative 
principles (Spear 2004). From an economic standpoint, cooperatives present a model of ownership 
different from conventional business organizations (Hansmann 1996). They are generally owned 
by their members/users rather than investors, unlike capitalist corporations. Part of the surplus 
goes to indivisible reserves, which are unavailable for distribution to members, even if a cooperative 
were to be dissolved. These reserves represent the collective assets of the organization. Another 
part of the surplus can in principle be divided pro rata among the members according to the volume 
of transactions (not members’ shares) they have conducted with the organization. When the net 
                                                          
8 See http://www.rescoop.eu. 
9 See Fici (2013) for a comparative analysis of the legal identity assigned to cooperatives in several European 
jurisdictions. 
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income is partially allocated as a return on capital shares, such profit distribution is subject to a cap, 
which suggests that maximization of return on capital may not be a key objective. Finally, as 
previously mentioned, cooperatives use a democratic governance structure, which involves equal 
individual voting rights (“one person, one vote”) and the absence of barriers to entry for new 
members. This is another major trait of the cooperative identity, as in other company types the 
default governance rule is “one share, one vote”. 
Why would CBE initiatives, and cooperatives in particular, help solve the collective-action problem 
that arises in the diffusion of sustainable technologies and practices? To understand this, it is crucial 
to acknowledge the importance of local actions in mitigating climate change. Many analysts call for 
an institutional solution at the global level, because global threats such as climate change are 
believed to require “global solutions”, negotiated at the international level (Nordhaus 1994; Stern 
2007; Wiener 2007). Solutions to the climate crisis certainly demand efforts at the international 
level, where most efforts are now being concentrated. Yet, in line with the polycentric governance 
approach, a global policy is not the only strategy needed and positive actions are required at 
multiple, smaller scales to start the process of climate change mitigation and secure the efforts 
made at the global level (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005; Bulkeley and Kern 2006; Ostrom 2010, 2012). 
Indeed, collective-action problems faced by large groups, such as the problem represented by 
climate change mitigation, are often decomposable into social dilemmas at a smaller scale, some of 
which are typically surmountable given the existence of social norms and, especially, of pre-existing 
trust networks (Ostrom 2010). Accordingly, several studies have argued that community-based 
energy initiatives facilitate collective action for climate change mitigation by fostering individual 
behavioral change toward more sustainable energy practices (Middlemiss 2008, 2011; Heiskanen et 
al. 2010; Seyfang 2010). CBE initiatives are said to influence their members’ energy-related 
behavior, notably by activating social norms.10 From an institutional perspective, a “community” is 
a social institution characterized by high entry and exit costs and non-anonymous interactions 
among members (Bowles and Gintis 1998, 2002). In addition, interactions among community 
members are more frequent and extensive than interactions with ‘outsiders’. These structural 
characteristics of interactions contrast with those of other institutions, such as markets, at least in 
their idealized forms. Market interactions are characterized by ephemerality of contact, anonymity 
among interacting actors and ease of entry and exit. In contrast to markets, by facilitating direct 
personal interactions, communities effectively encourage the formation of norms, such as 
                                                          
10 Social norms are “customary rules of behavior that coordinate our interactions with others. Once a particular way 
of doing things becomes established as a rule, it continues in force because we prefer to conform to the rule given the 
expectation that others are going to conform” (Young 2008: 647). 
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interpersonal trust, group identification, solidarity, reciprocity, reputation, personal pride, 
vengeance, etc.  
Norms have proven to be powerful and cost-efficient mechanisms to encourage energy 
conservation (Allcott 2011; Nolan et al. 2008).11 Gadenne et al. (2011) showed that environmental 
concern, combined with social norms and community influence, can positively contribute to 
environmental behaviors. Ek and Söderholm (2008) also found that social or moral norms can 
affect the purchase of green electricity. In addition, different qualitative studies suggest that some 
communities encourage low-carbon lifestyles by stressing the associated social rewards for climate-
beneficial actions (Middlemiss 2008) or by turning the social dilemma they represent into assurance 
games where members can be assured that others will participate (Heiskanen et al. 2010). 
Furthermore, CBE initiatives may lower information costs related to energy-efficiency technologies 
and conservation behaviors and therefore contribute in overcoming some of the informational and 
behavioral barriers to energy efficiency constituting the so-called “energy efficiency gap” 
(Gillingham and Palmer 2014).12 Indeed, CBE projects raise their members’ awareness about 
sustainable energy practices through communication channels and information provision. Again, 
norms are likely to play a role in this respect as the trustworthiness of the sources of information 
can positively affect the effectiveness of a message (Stern et al. 1986; Laskey and Syler 2013). 
Finally, several studies emphasized the effects of trust networks and peer behaviors on the adoption 
of sustainable micro-generation technologies, such as photovoltaic panels (e.g., Bollinger and 
Gillingham 2012). CBE initiatives are able to inform and inﬂuence consumer decision-making 
because of the trust networks they hold through longstanding linkages with key individuals in local 
communities (Noll et al. 2014). 
Clearly, economic incentives play a role as well in overcoming the collective-action problem. 
Indeed, by allowing citizens to become the residual claimants on the financial surplus generated by 
RE assets and on the decision-making power, CBE initiatives contribute to trigger investments in 
and public support of sustainable technologies at the community level. Thus, CBE initiatives 
combine both social norms and standard economic incentives to foster contributions to the global 
public good of averting climate change. The respective weight given to norm-driven behaviors and 
economic incentives is not necessarily the same in all CBE initiatives and depends on several 
                                                          
11 Social psychologists distinguish between two types of norms: injunctive norms and descriptive norms. The former 
involve perceptions of which behaviors are typically approved or disapproved of by other people and provide points 
of comparison, e.g., concerning others’ energy consumption, while the latter involve perceptions of other people's 
typical behaviors (Schultz et al. 2007). 
12 The energy efficiency gap describes the existence of unexploited ‘profitable’ investment options in energy saving 
technologies and practices. 
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factors, including how “market” and “community” institutional dimensions are prioritized within 
CBE initiatives, spatial characteristics of membership and the stage of development that CBE 
initiatives have reached (Bauwens 2016). 
The case of Connexus energy illustrates particularly well the roles of CBE initiatives in enhancing 
social norms and, ultimately, encouraging sustainable energy-related behaviors. Connexus Energy 
is the largest cooperatively-owned supplier in Minnesota (it supplies electricity to about 125,000 
households). In partnership with the energy efficiency company Opower, it has launched one of 
the longest behavioral intervention programs for energy efficiency in the United States. Home 
Energy Reports were sent to the 80,000 participating households and contained two components: 
an Action Steps Module providing household-specific energy conservation tips and a normative 
comparison of the household’s energy use to that of similar neighbors. During the three years since 
the start of the program, households of Connexus have collectively reduced their consumption by 
about 30,000 MWh and avoided CO2 emissions equivalent to 350 air flights in the US (Laskey and 
Syler 2013). Another empirical example is provided by the web platform EnergieID13, based in 
Flanders (northern Belgium). It enables energy users to follow their energy consumption and 
compare it with that of other similar households, thereby activating social norms. The website was 
put online in 2011 and offered free monitoring tools for individuals. In 2014, EnergieID was 
formalized as a cooperative, with the view of creating a common platform in which users can share 
their data with different service providers in a secured and anonymous way. EnergieID collaborates 
with partners such as municipalities, other cooperatives and service providers. For instance, the 
Flemish cooperatives BeauVent and Ecopower encouraged their members to use the platform and 
a more formal partnership was established in 2012 with the creation of groups called “BeauVent” 
and “Ecopower” on the website. The members who register in these groups are invited to report 
their electricity consumption each month. After one year, BeauVent and Ecopower analyze these 
consumption figures and provide members with a personalized report about their consumption 
and how they can reduce it further. They incentivize people to report their consumption by offering 
a prize (generally a device related to energy efficiency, such as a consumption monitor, a LED light, 
etc.) at the end of the period. 
Regarding trust in institutions involved in energy, which can also be described as a specific kind of 
social norm, the literature on CBE initiatives shows that these initiatives are typically characterized 
by a high degree of trust (Walker et al. 2010). Similarly, it has been shown that cooperatives are 
generally perceived as trustworthy, given their constraint on the profits distribution and their 
                                                          
13 http://www.energieid.be 
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democratic governance (Hansmann 1996; Ole Borgen 2001). In addition, citizen ownership 
contributes to the trust capital of CBE initiatives and cooperatives as it provides the guarantee to 
non-controlling stakeholders that the firm is managed by people who share their interest (Spear 
2000). This is consistent with the findings that horizontal networks, where people have equivalent 
status and power, engender trust because they facilitate exchanges of information and face-to-face 
communication, whereas hierarchies tend to inhibit information flows due to asymmetric power 
relationships (Kasperson et al. 1999). Finally, the local anchorage of CBE initiatives and 
cooperatives reduce the social distance between stakeholders, further consolidating trust. As a 
result of this high trust capital, there is evidence that community-based or cooperative ownership 
enhances social acceptability of controversial RE facilities, such as onshore wind power (Bauwens 
2015; Maruyama et al. 2007). Comparative research has shown that a high degree of citizen 
involvement in wind energy projects is positively correlated with high deployment rates (Bauwens 
et al. 2016; Toke et al. 2008). If citizens are the residual claimants on the organization’s surplus and 
decision-making power, they are likely to feel more fairly treated and would be more willing to 
accept or support the outcome. 
Finally, the ways CBE initiatives and cooperatives could contribute to overcoming the challenge of 
vested interests are less obvious, because this challenge is generally of a systemic nature that cannot 
be solved at the operational level, whereas most of the time the main mission of CBE initiatives 
and cooperatives is to implement sustainable energy projects on the ground. The notion of 
polycentric systems is crucial here. The Governance Systems variables affecting energy systems are 
the outcome of interactions between political, industrial and civil society actors located at higher 
levels of decision-making and thus local CBE initiatives taken individually are not likely to influence 
these decisions. However, as Ostrom (2005) notes, local communities often spontaneously form 
larger associations in order to deal with larger issues. The creation of federated structures is a way 
of enhancing the bargaining power of small players such as CBE initiatives in the face of incumbent 
energy actors. Indeed, the latter are smaller in number, have relatively homogeneous interests and 
are able to coordinate their substantial resources to resist any change that threatens their interests. 
In contrast, CBE initiatives are dispersed, generally focus on very local issues and have limited 
resources and political power. Several studies have acknowledged the difficulties experienced by 
grassroots initiatives in surviving in increasingly hostile environments, not to mention the obstacles 
to scaling up their impact and challenging mainstream actors (Bauwens et al. 2016; Seyfang et al. 
2013). Coordinated actions may thus be seen as an attempt to reach a more balanced distribution 
of political power in energy markets, which is still very biased in favor of large-scale players. While 
decentralization of governance in energy systems is sometimes conceived as a panacea, the 
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emergence of coordinated actions among cooperative initiatives calls for a more polycentric 
approach, according to which “various scales need to be taken into account when designing 
regulatory answers and setting up governance arrangements” (Goldthau 2014: 136). In this 
perspective, although decentralized energy systems obviously exhibit a strong local component, 
federated structures highlight the importance of the ability of local initiatives to transcend their 
local experience in order to form networks at higher levels and articulate their interests to national 
and international strategies.  
An Example of Federation of RE Cooperatives: REScoop.eu 
The creation of a federation of RE cooperatives at the European level, like REScoop.eu14, can 
typically be interpreted as a way to integrate the local level with the national and international ones. 
This federation was established in 2011 by a consortium of 12 cooperatives and 2 national 
federations, with the objective of supporting the development of RE cooperatives. By 2016 active 
membership had risen to more than 1,200 cooperatives. The mission of REScoop.eu encompasses 
three main activities. First of all, REScoop.eu seeks to gather and centralize information and 
knowledge from individual initiatives. It has, for example, identified and contacted more than 2,400 
existing RE cooperatives across Europe and created a database containing basic information about 
693 of such organizations. On the basis of this inventory, REScoop.eu has been able to produce a 
number of documents including best practice case studies, guides and handbooks targeting new 
initiatives. The second key activity conducted by REScoop.eu is the exchange of information within 
the network. This exchange takes place both through a web-based platform and through personal 
interactions.   Twenty-five “mentors”, i.e. representatives of well-established RE cooperatives, were 
also identified in the network in order to actively support emerging initiatives across Europe.   
Finally, REScoop.eu also conducts communication and advocacy activities toward external 
audiences, such as policy-makers, citizen groups, corporations, NGOs and the media. Accordingly, 
the missions of REScoop.eu encompass most of the missions of intermediary actors identified by 
Geels and Deuten (2006) and extended by Hargreaves et al. (2013). In addition, this network has 
formally set membership standards, which include the ICA principles mentioned above and 
additional ecological, social and ethical common principles in the charter of REScoop.eu. 
Therefore, the network has defined the set of basic rules shared by all initiatives belonging to the 
network. These rules are not blueprints, however, and do not preclude local initiatives from 
developing their own additional rules. Although the European federation is still in infancy, it does 
share some of the essential characteristics of a polycentric system. Firstly, local cooperatives form 
                                                          
14 See http://www.rescoop.eu. 
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a multiplicity of local autonomous decision centers that are able to put their different methods into 
practice and to make operational decisions independently from each other. Secondly, despite this 
autonomy in the implementation of local actions on the ground, the European federation has also 
defined some guiding principles under the form of a charter, which provides a framework of 
overarching basic rules, including the cooperative principles, which are supposed to be shared by 
all members. Currently, however, it does not have clear monitoring mechanisms against free-riding. 
Conclusion and recommendations for policy-makers 
Acknowledging the complex interdependencies between the various components of energy 
systems is essential for designing effective responses to the urgent challenges posed by the on-
going energy transition. Elinor Ostrom’s contribution to the literature on social-ecological systems 
fits well with complexity theories and, in particular, with hierarchical perspectives on complex 
systems. This chapter argued that present and future energy demand and supply systems can be 
adequately conceptualized as SESs and that Ostrom’s polycentric approach holds great promise 
for analyses of their institutional resilience. 
Institutional resilience of energy systems and their capacity to adapt to changing conditions are 
crucial factors in tackling present and future energy and climate change challenges. However, 
different obstacles undermine this resilience capacity. The present chapter focused on three of 
these hindrances: the collective-action problem in the diffusion of more sustainable energy 
technologies and practices, the lack of trust in conventional energy actors and the existence of 
strong vested interests within the energy industry. It showed that community-based energy 
initiatives, as parts of larger polycentric systems, may greatly help overcome these barriers and, 
thereby, enhance the institutional resilience of energy systems. More specifically, it was argued that 
CBE initiatives and RE cooperatives present institutional features encouraging the activation of 
social norms and a high trust capital, therefore enabling them to offer effective solutions to avoid 
free-riding and enhance trust in energy institutions and organizations. The creation of federated 
polycentric structures may also offer a partial response to the existence of vested interests in favor 
of the status quo. 
While social and environmental contexts within which policy interventions take place become more 
and more complex and uncertain, a polycentric approach appears to offer a flexible and adaptive 
framework for the governance of the low-carbon transition. In this approach, a crucial role for 
policy-makers is to create favorable conditions for the self-organization of local communities. They 
must also ensure the coordination of the whole system of initiatives and guarantee the enforcement 
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of the overarching set of rules common to all by sanctioning defection from compliance. As 
Mansbridge (2014) noted, they should also provide a relatively neutral source of information, 
manage potential conflicts and facilitate negotiations between lower-level governance units. All in 
all, the vision of the state’s role in the polycentric governance perspective is that of a “supportive” 
state. It should cope with complex problems of modern life, such as energy-related challenges, by 
relying on the massive amount of social capital contained in local communities and let local self-
organized initiatives flourish, thereby enforcing individuals’ and communities’ feeling of autonomy 
and self-determination. 
References 
Agrawal, A. 2001. 'Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources.' World 
Development, 29:10, 1649-72. 
Aligica, P. D. & Tarko, V. 2014. 'Institutional Resilience and Economic Systems: Lessons from Elinor 
Ostrom's Work.' Comp Econ Stud, 56:1, 52-76. 
Allcott, H. 2011. 'Social norms and energy conservation.' Journal of Public Economics, 95:9–10, 1082-95. 
Alston, L. J., Libecap, G. D. & Mueller, B. 1999. Titles, Conflict, and Land Use: The Development of Property Rights 
and Land Reform on the Brazilian Amazon Frontier. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Anderies, J. M., Folke, C., Walker, B. & Ostrom, E. 2013. 'Aligning Key Concepts for Global Change Policy: 
Robustness, Resilience, and Sustainability.' Ecology and Society, 18:2. 
Anderies, J. M., Janssen, M. & Ostrom, E. 2004. 'A framework to analyze the robustness of social-ecological 
systems from an institutional perspective.' Ecology and Society, 9:1, 18. 
Andersson, K. P. & Ostrom, E. 2008. 'Analyzing Decentralized Resource Regimes from a Polycentric 
Perspective.' Policy Sciences, 41:1, 71-93. 
Arthur, B. 1994. Increasing returns and path dependence in the economy. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press. 
Batley, S. L., Colbourne, D., Fleming, P. D. & Urwin, P. 2001. 'Citizen versus consumer: challenges in the 
UK green power market.' Energy Policy, 29:6, 479-87. 
Bauwens, T. 2015. 'Propriété coopérative et acceptabilité sociale de l’éolien terrestre.' Reflets et Perspectives de 
la Vie Economique, LIV:1, 59-70. 
Bauwens, T. 2016. 'Explaining the diversity of motivations behind community renewable energy.' Energy 
Policy, 93, 278-90. 
Bauwens, T., Gotchev, B. & Holstenkamp, L. 2016. 'What drives the development of community energy in 
Europe? The case of wind power cooperatives.' Energy Research & Social Science, 13, 136-47. 
Birchall, J. 1997. The International Cooperative Movement. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Black, J. 2008. 'Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory regimes.' 
Regulation & Governance, 2:2, 137-64. 
Bollinger, B. & Gillingham, K. 2012. 'Peer Effects in the Diffusion of Solar Photovoltaic Panels.' Marketing 
Science, 31:6, 900-12. 
Borzaga, C. & Defourny, J. 2001. The Emergence of Social Enterprise. London & New York: Routledge. 
Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. 1998. 'The Moral Economy of Communities: Structured Populations and the 
Evolution of Pro-Social Norms.' Evolution and Human Behavior, 19:1, 3-25. 
Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. 2002. 'Social Capital And Community Governance.' The Economic Journal, 112:483, 
F419-F36. 
Bulkeley, H. & Betsill, M. 2005. 'Rethinking Sustainable Cities: Multilevel Governance and the 'Urban' 
Politics of Climate Change.' Environmental Politics, 14:1, 42-63. 
Bulkeley, H. & Kern, K. 2006. 'Local Government and the Governing of Climate Change in Germany and 
the UK.' Urban Studies, 43:12, 2237-59. 
Byrnes, B., Jones, C. & Goodman, S. 1999. 'Contingent Valuation and Real Economic Commitments: 
Evidence from Electric Utility Green Pricing Programmes.' Journal of Environmental Planning and 
Management, 42:2, 149-66. 
24 
 
Carlson, J. M. & Doyle, J. 2002. 'Complexity and Robustness.' Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
9:1, 2499-545. 
Carpenter, S., Walker, B., Anderies, J. M. & Abel, N. 2001. 'From Metaphor to Measurement: Resilience of 
What to What?' Ecosystems, 4:8, 765-81. 
Clement, F. 2010. 'Analysing decentralised natural resource governance: proposition for a “politicised” 
institutional analysis and development framework.' Policy Sciences, 43:2, 129-56. 
Cvetkovich, G. 1999. 'The Attribution of Social Trust.' In G. Cvetkovich & R. E. Lofstedt (Eds.) Social Trust 
and the Management of Risk: 53-61. London: Earthscan. 
David, P. A. 1985. 'Clio and the Economics of QWERTY.' American Economic Review, 75:2, 332. 
Devine-Wright, P. 2007. 'Energy Citizenship: Psychological Aspects Of Evolution In Sustainable 
Energy Technologies.' In J. Murphy (Ed.) Governing Technology for Sustainability: 63-86. 
London: Earthscan. 
Ek, K. & Söderholm, P. 2008. 'Norms and economic motivation in the Swedish green electricity market.' 
Ecological Economics, 68:1–2, 169-82. 
Ekins, P., Strachan, N., Keppo, I., Usher, W., Skea, J. & Anandarajah, G. 2013. 'The UK energy system in 
2050: Comparing Low-Carbon, Resilient Scenarios.' London: UKERC. 
Eltham, D. C., Harrison, G. P. & Allen, S. J. 2008. 'Change in public attitudes towards a Cornish wind farm: 
Implications for planning.' Energy Policy, 36:1, 23-33. 
Eyre, N. 2013. 'Decentralization of governance in the low-carbon transition.' In R. Fouquet (Ed.) Handbook 
on Energy and Climate Change: 581–97. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Fici, A. 2013. 'Cooperative Identity and the Law.' European Business Law Review, 24:1, 37-64. 
Fouquet, R. 2010. 'The slow search for solutions: Lessons from historical energy transitions by sector and 
service.' Energy Policy, 38:11, 6586-96. 
Gadenne, D., Sharma, B., Kerr, D. & Smith, T. 2011. 'The influence of consumers' environmental beliefs 
and attitudes on energy saving behaviours.' Energy Policy, 39:12, 7684-94. 
Geels, F. & Deuten, J. J. 2006. 'Local and global dynamics in technological development: a socio-cognitive 
perspective on knowledge flows and lessons from reinforced concrete.' Science and Public Policy, 33:4, 
265-75. 
Gillingham, K. & Palmer, K. 2014. 'Bridging the Energy Efficiency Gap: Policy Insights from Economic 
Theory and Empirical Evidence.' Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 8:1, 18-38. 
Goldthau, A. 2014. 'Rethinking the governance of energy infrastructure: Scale, decentralization and 
polycentrism.' Energy Research & Social Science, 1:0, 134-40. 
Greenberg, M. R. 2014. 'Energy policy and research: The underappreciation of trust.' Energy Research & Social 
Science, 1, 152-60. 
Greenberg, M. R., Popper, F. J. & Truelove, H. B. 2012. 'Are LULUs still enduringly objectionable?' Journal 
of Environmental Planning and Management, 55:6, 713-31. 
Groot, K. 2014. 'The Impact of Distributed Generation on European Power Utilities.' In F. P. Sioshansi 
(Ed.) Distributed Generation and its Implication for the Utility Industry. Academic Press. 
Gunderson, L. H. 2000. 'Ecological Resilience—In Theory and Application.' Annual Review of Ecology and 
Systematics, 31:1, 425-39. 
Hansmann, H. 1996. The ownership of enterprise. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Hardin, G. 1968. 'The Tragedy of the Commons.' Science, 162:3859, 1243-48. 
Hargreaves, T., Hielscher, S., Seyfang, G. & Smith, A. 2013. 'Grassroots innovations in community energy: 
The role of intermediaries in niche development.' Global Environmental Change, 23:5, 868-80. 
Heiskanen, E., Johnson, M., Robinson, S., Vadovics, E. & Saastamoinen, M. 2010. 'Low-carbon 
communities as a context for individual behavioural change.' Energy Policy, 38:12, 7586-95. 
Hodbod, J. & Adger, W. N. 2014. 'Integrating social-ecological dynamics and resilience into energy systems 
research.' Energy Research & Social Science, 1:0, 226-31. 
Holling, C., Schindler, D., Walker, B. & Roughgarden, J. 1995. 'Biodiversity in the functioning of 
ecosystems: An ecological synthesis.' In C. Perring, K.-G. Mäle, C. Folke, C. Holling & B.-O. 
Jansson (Eds.) Biodiversity Loss: Economic and Ecological Issues: 44–83. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Huijts, N. M. A., Molin, E. J. E. & Steg, L. 2012. 'Psychological factors influencing sustainable energy 
technology acceptance: A review-based comprehensive framework.' Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews, 16:1, 525-31. 
25 
 
Huybrechts, B. & Mertens, S. 2014. 'The Relevance Of The Cooperative Model In The Field Of Renewable 
Energy.' Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 85:2, 193-212. 
International Cooperative Alliance (I.C.A.) 1995. 'Statement on the cooperative identity.' Review of 
International Cooperation, 88:3, 3-4. 
International Energy Agency (I.E.A.) 2015. 'Key World Energy Statistics 2015.' Paris: International Energy 
Agency. 
Irwin, A. 1995. Citizen Science:A Study of People, Expertise, and Sustainable Development. London: Routledge. 
Janssen, M. A., Anderies, J. M. & Ostrom, E. 2007. 'Robustness of Social-Ecological Systems to Spatial and 
Temporal Variability.' Society & Natural Resources, 20:4, 307-22. 
Jobert, A., Laborgne, P. & Mimler, S. 2007. 'Local acceptance of wind energy: Factors of success identified 
in French and German case studies.' Energy Policy, 35:5, 2751-60. 
Kasperson, R. E., Golding, D. & Kasperson, J. K. 1999. 'Risk Trust and Democratic Theory.' In G. 
Cvetkovich & R. E. Lofstedt (Eds.) Social Trust and the Management of Risk. London: Earthscan. 
Koestler, A. 1973. 'The Tree and The Candle.' In W. Gray & N. D. Rizzo (Eds.) Unity through Diversity, pt 1: 
287-314. New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers. 
Koster, A. & Anderies, J. 2013. 'Institutional Factors That Determine Energy Transitions: A Comparative 
Case Study Approach.' In E. Michalena & J. M. Hills (Eds.) Renewable Energy Governance: 33-61. 
Springer London. 
Künneke, R. W. 2008. 'Institutional reform and technological practice: the case of electricity.' Industrial & 
Corporate Change, 17:2, 233-65. 
Kuzemko, C., Lockwood, M., Mitchell, C. & Hoggett, R. 2016. 'Governing for sustainable energy system 
change: Politics, contexts and contingency.' Energy Research & Social Science, 12, 96-105. 
Laskey, A. & Syler, B. 2013. 'The Ultimate Challenge: Getting Consumers Engaged In Energy Efficency.' 
In F. P. Sioshansi (Ed.) Energy Efficiency: Towards the End of Demand Growth. Oxford: Academic Press. 
Longo, A., Markandya, A. & Petrucci, M. 2008. 'The internalization of externalities in the production of 
electricity: Willingness to pay for the attributes of a policy for renewable energy.' Ecological Economics, 
67:1, 140-52. 
Mansbridge, J. 2014. 'The role of the state in governing the commons.' Environmental Science & Policy, 36, 8-
10. 
Marshall, G., Connell, D. & Taylor, B. M. 2013. 'Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin: A century  of polycentric 
experiments in cross-border integration of water resources management.' International Journal of 
Water Governance, 1, 231-51. 
Maruyama, Y., Nishikido, M. & Iida, T. 2007. 'The rise of community wind power in Japan: Enhanced 
acceptance through social innovation.' Energy Policy, 35:5, 2761-69. 
McGinnis, M. D. 2011. 'An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the Ostrom Workshop: A Simple 
Guide to a Complex Framework.' Policy Studies Journal, 39:1, 169-83. 
McGinnis, M. D. & Ostrom, E. 2014. 'Social-ecological system framework: initial changes and continuing 
challenges.' Ecology and Society, 19:2. 
McShea, D. W. 2001. 'The hierarchical structure of organisms: a scale and documentation of a trend in the 
maximum.' Paleobiology, 27:2, 405-23. 
Meinzen-Dick, R. 2007. 'Beyond panaceas in water institutions.' Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
104:39, 15200-05. 
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2016. “social.” (online) URL: http://www.m-w.com. 
Middlemiss, L. 2008. 'Influencing individual sustainability: a review of the evidence on the role of 
community-based organisations.' International Journal of Environment and Sustainable Development, 7:1, 
78-93. 
Middlemiss, L. 2011. 'The effects of community-based action for sustainability on participants' lifestyles.' 
Local Environment, 16:3, 265-80. 
Mitchell, M. 2009. Complexity: A Guided Tour. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Moe, E. 2010. 'Energy, industry and politics: Energy, vested interests, and long-term economic growth and 
development.' Energy, 35:4, 1730-40. 
Moe, E. 2015. Renewable Energy Transformation or Fossil Fuel Backlash: Vested Interests in the Political Economy. 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Morçöl, G. 2014. 'Self-Organization in Collective Action: Elinor Ostrom’s Contributions and Complexity 
Theory.' Complexity, Governance & Networks, 1:2, 9-22. 
26 
 
Mumford, J. & Gray, D. 2010. 'Consumer engagement in alternative energy—Can the regulators and 
suppliers be trusted?' Energy Policy, 38:6, 2664-71. 
Nagendra, H. & Ostrom, E. 2012. 'Polycentric governance of multifunctional forested landscapes.' 
International Journal of the Commons, 6:2, 104–33. 
Noll, D., Dawes, C. & Rai, V. 2014. 'Solar Community Organizations and active peer effects in the adoption 
of residential PV.' Energy Policy, 67, 330-43. 
Nolan, J. M., Schultz, P. W., Cialdini, R. B., Goldstein, N. J. & Griskevicius, V. 2008. 'Normative Social 
Influence is Underdetected.' Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34:7, 913-23. 
Nolden, C. 2013. 'Governing community energy—Feed-in tariffs and the development of community wind 
energy schemes in the United Kingdom and Germany.' Energy Policy, 63:0, 543-52. 
Nomura, N. & Akai, M. 2004. 'Willingness to pay for green electricity in Japan as estimated through 
contingent valuation method.' Applied Energy, 78:4, 453-63. 
Nordhaus, W. D. 1994. Managing the global commons. The economics of climate change. Cambridge, MA M.I.T. Press  
Ohler, A. M. & Billger, S. M. 2014. 'Does environmental concern change the tragedy of the commons? 
Factors affecting energy saving behaviors and electricity usage.' Ecological Economics, 107:0, 1-12. 
Ole Borgen, S. 2001. 'Identification as a Trust-Generating Mechanism in Cooperatives.' Annals of Public and 
Cooperative Economics, 72:2, 209-28. 
Olson, M. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action : Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press. 
Olson, M. 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Ostrom, E. 1999. 'Coping with tragedies of the commons.' Annual Review of Political Science, 2:1, 493-535. 
Ostrom, E. 2000. 'Crowding out Citizenship.' Scandinavian Political Studies, 23:1, 3-16. 
Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Ostrom, E. 2009. 'A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems.' Science, 
325:5939, 419-22. 
Ostrom, E. 2010. 'Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global environmental change.' 
Global Environmental Change, 20:4, 550-57. 
Ostrom, E. 2012. 'Nested externalities and polycentric institutions: must we wait for global solutions to 
climate change before taking actions at other scales?' Economic Theory, 49:2, 353-69. 
Ostrom, V., Tiebout, C. M. & Warren, R. 1961. 'The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: 
A Theoretical Inquiry.' The American Political Science Review, 55:4, 831-42. 
Pahl-Wostl, C. & Knieper, C. 2014. 'The capacity of water governance to deal with the climate change 
adaptation challenge: Using fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis to distinguish between 
polycentric, fragmented and centralized regimes.' Global Environmental Change, 29, 139-54. 
Platteau, J.-P. 2004. 'Monitoring Elite Capture in Community-Driven Development.' Development and Change, 
35:2, 223-46. 
Platteau, J.-P. & Gaspart, F. 2003. 'The Risk of Resource Misappropriation in Community-Driven 
Development.' World Development, 31:10, 1687-703. 
Powers, K. J. & Thompson, F. 1994. 'Managing coprovision: Using expectancy theory to overcome the free-
rider problem.' Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory, 4:2, 179. 
Samuelson, P. A. 1954. 'The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure.' The Review of Economics and Statistics, 36:4, 
387-89. 
Sandler, T. 2004. Global Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Schultz, P. W., Nolan, J. M., Cialdini, R. B., Goldstein, N. J. & Griskevicius, V. 2007. 'The Constructive, 
Destructive, and Reconstructive Power of Social Norms.' Psychological Science, 18:5, 429-34. 
Seyfang, G. 2010. 'Community action for sustainable housing: Building a low-carbon future.' Energy Policy, 
38:12, 7624-33. 
Seyfang, G., Park, J. J. & Smith, A. 2013. 'A thousand flowers blooming? An examination of community 
energy in the UK.' Energy Policy, 61:0, 977-89. 
Shepsle, K. A. 1989. 'Studying Institutions: Lessons From the Rational Choice Approach.' Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, 1:2, 131-47. 
Simon, H. A. 1962. 'The Architecture of Complexity.' Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 106:6, 
467-82. 
Slovic, P. 1993. 'Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy.' Risk Analysis, 13:6, 675-82. 
27 
 
Smith, A. 2012. 'Civil Society in Sustainable Energy Transitions.' In G. Verbong & D. Loorbach (Eds.) 
Governing the Energy Transition: reality, illusion, or necessity. New York: Routledge. 
Sovacool, B. K. 2011. 'An international comparison of four polycentric approaches to climate and energy 
governance.' Energy Policy, 39:6, 3832-44. 
Sovacool, B. K. 2012. 'Energy security: challenges and needs.' Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Energy and 
Environment, 1:1, 51-59. 
Sovacool, B. K. & Dworkin, M. H. 2014. Global Energy Justice: Problems, Principles, and Practices. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Sovacool, B. K., Sidortsov, R. V. & Jones, B. R. 2014. Energy Security, Equality, and Justice. Abingdon & New 
York: Routledge. 
Spear, R. 2000. 'The Co-operative Advantage.' Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 71:4, 507-23. 
Spear, R. 2004. 'From Co-operative to Social Enterprise: Trends in European Experience.' In C. Borzaga & 
R. Spear (Eds.) Trends and challenges for Co-operatives and Social Enterprises in developed and transition 
countries. Trento: Edizione 31. 
Stern, N. 2007. The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Stern, P. C. 2014. 'Individual and household interactions with energy systems: Toward integrated 
understanding.' Energy Research & Social Science, 1:0, 41-48. 
Stern, P. C., Aronson, E., Darley, J. M., Hill, D. H., Hirst, E., Kempton, W. & Wilbanks, T. J. 1986. 'The 
Effectiveness of Incentives for Residential Energy Conservation.' Evaluation Review, 10:2, 147-76. 
Tarko, V. 2015. 'Polycentric structure and informal norms: competition and coordination within the 
scientific community.' Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 28:1, 63-80. 
Toke, D., Breukers, S. & Wolsink, M. 2008. 'Wind power deployment outcomes: How can we account for 
the differences?' Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 12:4, 1129-47. 
Unruh, G. C. 2000. 'Understanding carbon lock-in.' Energy Policy, 28:12, 817-30. 
von Bertalanffy, L. 1969. General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications (Revised Edition). George 
Braziller Inc. 
Walker, G. & Devine-Wright, P. 2008. 'Community renewable energy: What should it mean?' Energy Policy, 
36:2, 497-500. 
Walker, G., Devine-Wright, P., Hunter, S., High, H. & Evans, B. 2010. 'Trust and community: Exploring 
the meanings, contexts and dynamics of community renewable energy.' Energy Policy, 38:6, 2655-63. 
Walker, B., C. S. Holling, S. R. Carpenter, and A. Kinzig. 2004. Resilience, adaptability and transformability 
in social–ecological systems. Ecology and Society 9:2, 5-14. 
Wiener, J. B. 2007. 'Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies.' Univ PA Law Rev, 
155:6, 1961-79. 
Wilson, D. S., Ostrom, E. & Cox, M. E. 2013. 'Generalizing the core design principles for the efficacy of 
groups.' Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 90, Supplement, S21-S32. 
Wiser, R. H. 1998. 'Green power marketing: increasing customer demand for renewable energy.' Utilities 
Policy, 7:2, 107-19. 
Wynne, B. 1996. 'May the Sheep Safely Graze? A Reflexive View of the Expert–Lay Knowledge Divide.' In 
S. Lash, B. Szerszynski & B. Wynne (Eds.) Risk, Environment and Modernity: Towards a New Ecology. : 
44-84. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Yandle, T. & Dewees, C. 2003. 'Privatizing the Commons . . . Twelve Years Later: Fishers’ Experiences with 
New Zealand’s Market-Based Fisheries Management.' In N. Dolsak & E. Ostrom (Eds.) The 
Commons in the New Millennium: Challenges and Adaptations: 101–27. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
